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BOOK REVIEW 
The Promise and Peril of Environmental Justice. By 
Christopher H. Foreman, Jr. Washington, D.C., Brookings 
Institution Press, 1998. Pp. 160. Hard Cover. $22.95. 
Reviewed by Alan Ramo* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Christopher H. Foreman, Jr.'s The Promise and Peril of 
Environmental Justice l asserts several disturbing critiques of 
the environmental justice movement. Focusing more on the 
"peril" than the "promise," Foreman's book is in many re-
spects a brief attacking environmental justice activists for 
everything from the movement's targets to how it engages 
those targets. 
The environmental justice movement grew out of local 
grassroots opposition to the siting of toxic landfills and other 
noxious sources of pollution in predominantly communities of 
color.2 Movement leaders like Benjamin Chavis originally fo-
cused upon "environmental racism," "[t]he deliberate target-
ing of people of color communities for toxic waste facilities 
and the official sanctioning of life-threatening presence of 
poisons and pollutants in people of color communities."3 
* Associate Professor, Golden Gate University School of Law. J.D., Boalt 
HaIl School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; B.A, Stanford Univer-
sity. Professor Ramo directs the Environmental Law and Justice Clinic and the 
LL.M. in Environmental Law program at Golden Gate University. 
1. CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1998). 
2. See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice: A New Framework for 
Action, ENVTL. L. NEWS, Spring 1996, at 16. 
3. Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285, 289 (1995) (quoting Environmental 
Racism: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional 
Rights, 103d Congo (1993) (testimony of Dr. Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr.». 
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Later the movement led by activist-academics, such as Pro-
fessor Robert Bullard, focused on institutional racism that 
"intentionally or unintentionally, differentially impacts or 
disadvantages individuals, groups, or communities based on 
race or color.,,4 The First National People of Color Environ-
mental Leadership Summit, held in Washington, D.C. in 
1991, adopted seventeen "Principles of Environmental Jus-
tice" that broadly defined environmental justice to require 
that environmental policy "be based on mutual respect and 
justice for all peoples, free from any form of discrimination or 
bias."s 
Foreman gives voice to those who are critical of the semi-
nal studies identifying patterns of environmental injustice. 
He questions the characterization of Love Canal6 or Louisi-
ana's "Cancer Alley"7 as symbols of the toxic nightmare that 
4. Alice L. Brown, Environmental Justice: New Civil Rights Frontier, Prac-
ticing Law Institute, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAw UPDATE 1993, at 813, 815 (PLI 
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5162, 1993) (quoting 
Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Equity: Examining the Evidence of Environ-
mental Racism, LAND USE F., Winter 1993, at 6). 
5. First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, Prin-
ciples of Environmental Justice, preamble (Oct. 27, 1991). Environmental jus-
tice is also defined by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") as 
follows: 
[T]he concept of focusing attention on the environmental and human 
health conditions in minority communities and low-income communi-
ties in an effort to ensure a quality environment for all citizens, re-
gardless of race, ethnicity, or other socioeconomic factors. It is also 
concerned with promoting nondiscrimination among low-income and 
minority communities to ensure access to public information on, and 
public participation in matters relating to human health and the envi-
ronment. 
U.S. EPA, Environmental Justice (visited Apr. 7, 2000) <http://www.epa.gov/ 
unix0008/water/munilej.html>. 
6. Love Canal is the neighborhood near Niagara Falls that was evacuated 
by federal authorities after the discovery of chemicals leaking into homes and a 
nearby school from a canal used as a toxic dump site by the Hooker Chemical 
and Plastics Corporation. Occidental Chemical Corporation, which purchased 
Hooker, eventually paid $129 million for the relocation and cleanup of the site. 
The furor over Love Canal eventually led to the adoption of the federal "super-
fund" program. See James Gerstenzang, Firm Agrees to Settle Love Canal Suit; 
Pollution: Occidental Chemical Will Pay 2 Government Agencies for $129-
Million Cost of Cleaning Up Toxic Waste Site Near Niagara Falls, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 22, 1995, at A43; FOREMAN, supra note 1, at 16. 
7. "Cancer Alley" is the name given by local residents to an area along the 
Mississippi River between Baton Rouge and just south of New Orleans where 
seven oil refineries and between 175 and 350 heavy industrial plants are lo-
cated, constituting approximately one-quarter of the nation's petrochemical 
pollution. See Barbara Koeppel, Cancer Alley, Lousiana, NATION, Nov. 8, 1999, 
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the chemical industry is bringing to local communities. Other 
than making the question of whether environmental harms 
are distributed inequitably a national issue, and highlighting 
children's exposure to lead and farmworkers' exposure to pes-
ticides as real problems, it is difficult to find anything that 
Foreman would contend is salutary in the movement. 
II. CRITICIZING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ACTIVISTS 
For those who consider themselves advocates of environ-
mental justice, it would be convenient to dismiss Foreman's 
book as merely an ideological attack on the environmental 
justice movement. Foreman indeed gives ammunition to the 
harshest of environmental justice critics by indulging in a su-
perficial psychological deconstruction of the movement. For 
example, he claims that "for many activists, environmental 
justice is mostly about accountability and political power 
rather than the more technical issue of environmental risks 
facing communities."s He claims that the movement "effec-
tively speaks to the fear and anger among local communities 
feeling overwhelmed by forces beyond their control and out-
raged by what they perceive to be assaults on their collective 
quality of life.,,9 He accuses the movement of, in effect, pan-
dering to the "collective fear" of "desperate, fearful citizens."lo 
According to Foreman, the movement is "hostile" and "suspi-
cious" of risk assessments.ll As for the movement's focus 
upon hazardous waste sites, Foreman asserts that "[e]vidence 
and technical analysis relating to risk or health impacts tend 
to play only a small role in the anxiety and advocacy directed 
at such facilities. ,,12 
In Foreman's view, the environmental justice movement 
has been fueled by "toxic terror" about hazardous waste facili-
ties that pose little risk.13 Foreman takes on the seminal toxic 
event, the migration of toxic chemicals into the basements of 
homes at Love Canal, and dismisses it as nearly a non-event. 
at 16; David Maraniss & Michael Weisskopf, Jobs and Illness in Petrochemical 
Corridor; In Lousiana, Pollution is Familiar But Pattern of Disease is New, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 22,1987, atA1; FOREMAN, supra note 1, at 75. 
8. FOREMAN, supra note 1, at 58. 
9. ld. at 28-29. 
10. ld. at 39, 40. 
11. ld. at 20. See generally infra Part IV.A-B. 
12. FOREMAN, supra note 1, at 20. 
13. ld. at 17. 
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"Considerable subsequent analysis has suggested that the 
hysteria at Love Canal was very likely disproportionate to the 
actual health threat neighborhood residents faced.,,14 
While those in the environmental justice movement are 
not above having their motives questioned, Foreman's analy-
sis seems unpersuasive and unduly harsh on this front. The 
depiction of the motives of hundreds of thousands of people in 
a movement is hardly supported by taking a few excerpts 
from statements by certain activists in the field. Relying on 
these few statements is improper especially when, as Fore-
man correctly notes, the movement is truly grassroots, with-
out a hierarchy or national leadership. 
III. CRITICIZING THE STUDIES IDENTIFYING 
ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE 
While it might be sociologically interesting to determine 
the validity of these kinds of charges, the question of greater 
moment is whether the substantive criticisms by environ-
mental justice critics have merit. Similarly, what seems most 
important in evaluating the environmental justice movement 
is whether disparate adverse environmental problems exist, 
whether the movement is addressing the most important of 
these problems, and whether the movement's strategy is the 
most effective. 
Foreman's discussion of whether disparate environ-
mental problems exist is unfairly weighted against environ-
mental justice. For example, he addresses the seminal 
United Church of Christ study,t5 which documented a racial 
pattern in the siting of hazardous wastes sites. He accurately 
discusses criticisms showing the methodological limits of the 
study. What he does not highlight in his text, however, are 
14. Id. at 16. 
15. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC 
WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL 
AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAzARDous 
WASTE SITES (1987). The study, using data on location of hazardous waste sites 
and demographic data based upon zip codes, found that the percentage of mi-
nority residents in communities containing these waste sites was twice as great 
as the percentage of minority residents in zip codes without such facilities (24% 
versus 12%), and that the proportion of racial minorities in communities con-
taining two facilities or major landfills was three times greater (38%). See Lena 
Williams, Race Bias Found in Location of Toxic Dumps, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 
1987, atA20. 
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subsequent studies with better methodology that affirmed the 
results of the United Church of Christ study. For example, in 
1992, Paul Mohai and Bunay Bryant examined and reported 
on fifteen studies that documented "a class and racial bias" in 
the distribution of environmental hazards.Is Further, Fore-
man discusses the Amherst critique of the United Church of 
Christ study, which complained of the use of zip codes instead 
of census data.17 However, he ignores the rebuttal to the 
Amherst critique that used an updated analysis employing 
census data, confirmed the earlier results, and indicated that 
the problem was actually getting worse. IS In 1994, Benjamin 
Goldman reviewed sixty-four studies of environmental dis-
parities, all but one of which found environmental disparities 
by either race or income.19 
Foreman's discussion of Love Canal; Times Beach, Mis-
SOuri;20 and Louisiana's "Cancer Alley" is disappointedly su-
perficial. The discussion would be more on point if Foreman 
described the difficulty of proving, through epidemiology,21 the 
health effects from low levels of chemicals in small popula-
tions-such as minority populations. He notes that "[a]n ar-
ray of uncertainties and confounding factors bedevil efforts to 
16. Bunay Bryant & Paul Mohai, Environmental Racism: Reviewing the 
Evidence, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAzARDs 163, 164, 
169 (Bunay Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992). 
17. See FOREMAN, supra note 1, at 25. 
18. BENJAMIN A GoLDMAN ET AL., TOXIC WASTES AND RACE REVISITED: AN 
UPDATE OF THE 1987 REpORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC 
CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNlTlES WITH HAzARDous WASTE SITE I, at 13-18 
(1994). 
19. See Bullard, supra note 2, at 20 (citing BENJAMIN GoLDMAN, NATIONAL 
WILDLIFE FEDERATION, NOT JUST PROSPERITY: ACHIEVING SUSTAINABILITY 
WITH ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1994)). 
20. Times Beach, Missouri is the former community where dioxin-laced oil 
was used for dust suppression on unpaved roads, eventually leading to the fed-
eral government buying out the homes of 2200 residents in 1983 and a massive 
cleanup under the superfund program. See Laurel Shaper Walters, The Legacy 
of an Unnatural Disaster, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 23, 1997, at 4; 
FOREMAN, supra note I, at 77. 
21. Epidemiology investigates all elements contributing to the occurrence or 
nonoccurrence of a disease in a population, usually by examining public health 
data for a given population over many years and comparing the frequency of ill-
ness to that which would be expected for a similar demographic population. 
Using other data, sometimes from health or lifestyle surveys or other sociologi-
cal data, attempts are made to control factors that may explain the disease, in 
the hope of developing an analysis of the cause of the disease or at least ruling 
out other factors that may explain its frequency. See FOREMAN, supra note 1, at 
69. 
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discern disease causation, especially where general environ-
mental factors, rather than specific microbes or behaviors, are 
the suspected culprits."22 Yet a few sentences later, Foreman 
seems to dismiss criticisms of the Love Canal and Agent Or-
ange studies as merely a result of the "mistrust" by those 
"predisposed to distrust the results of analysis.,,23 
High, immediately fatal results from a toxic exposure are 
fairly easy to document: simply count the bodies near the 
catastrophic exposure. The more difficult problem, and the 
source of what Foreman seems to dismiss cavalierly as hys-
teria, is that low levels of toxic chemicals may produce can-
cers that only manifest themselves years later in people who 
have moved or been subject to other exposures that contrib-
uted to the immune breakdown that results in a cancer. Pin-
pointing the source of a cancer cluster, or even discovering a 
cancer cluster, is a challenge that epidemiological science is 
only beginning to address. Remember, even when an atomic 
bomb is dropped on a civilian population, as was done in Hi-
roshima, experts can disagree significantly over health im-
pacts for those who survived and were exposed to the lowest 
levels of radiation. More than fifty years later, experts con-
tinue to disagree on the significance of cancers resulting from 
that catastrophe.24 
Foreman writes off Love Canal and Times Beach, stating 
that "many analysts now regard the health impacts at issue 
in each of these episodes to have been considerably exagger-
ated."25 From this statement, the converse also appears true: 
many analysts now regard the health impacts to not have 
been considerably exaggerated. If the converse is true, then 
Foreman should have stated it. Further, if the converse is not 
true, why did he use the careful language, "many"? In fact, 
the reality may be that epidimiology is having a difficult time 
tracing those exposed, determining the extent of their expo-
sure, and developing a methodology sufficient to pick up and 
isolate the impacts from this exposure.26 
22. FOREMAN, supra note 1, at 70. 
23. ld. 
24. See Radiation Sensitivity; Kids, Elderly May Not Be Well Served By 
Safety Rules, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 4, 1998, at 7. 
25. FOREMAN, supra note 1, at 77. 
26. See Anthony Cardinale, Ex-Love Canal Residents Sought for Health 
Study, BUFF. NEWS, Apr. 14, 1999, at 5B; Richard E. Baldwin, More Study 
Urged on Love Canal Health Effects, BUFF. NEWS, Apr. 13, 1999, at 5B. 
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Foreman cites statistics from Louisiana suggesting that 
there is no statewide or cancer-alley cancer epidemic and 
claims there is a scientific consensus to this point. Compare 
that conclusion with Barbara Koeppel's article27 containing 
expert criticism of these studies, including their failure to fo-
cus in on neighborhood cancer rates on a scale smaller than 
zip codes, a critique Foreman seems to endorse in challenging 
the methodology of the United Church of Christ's study.28 
IV. FOREMAN'S CHALLENGES TO THE FuTuRE OF THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 
Foreman's one-sided, or at least, less-than-neutral pres-
entation of environmental justice studies should not, how-
ever, obscure some legitimate challenges Foreman poses to 
the future of the environmental justice movement, which in-
clude: (1) the failure to grapple with risk assessment, or the 
"proximity does not equal health effect" problem; (2) the fail-
ure to use risk assessment to compare risks and set priorities; 
(3) the failure to explore analytically the relationship between 
environmental hazards and social and economic justice; and 
(4) the failure to translate a grassroots movement into a na-
tionally influential policy making power. 
A. Failure to Address Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is a scientifically informed methodology 
for describing the likelihood of potential health effects or 
harms from a certain activity or exposure to a source of po-
tential harm, such as a toxic chemical.29 Risk assessment al-
lows analysts to identify health impacts from exposure to a 
chemical of concern by focusing not merely on geographical 
proximity, but instead evaluating with rigor the pathway of 
potential exposures, the intensity of the exposure and the 
chemical's biological impact on the human body. With con-
siderable force, Foreman makes the case that a blind rejection 
27. Koeppel, supra note 7. 
28. See supra text accompanying note 18. 
29. See Use of Risk Analysis and Cost-Benefit Analysis in Setting Environ-
mental Priorities: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Re-
sources, 103d Congo 89, 90 (1993) (statement of Thomas C. Jorling, Commis-
sioner, New York Dep't of EnvtI. Conservation), cited in Robert R. Kuehn, The 
Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 103, 108. 
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of risk assessment would mean that environmental justice ac-
tivists and the communities they are trying to protect might 
be fighting battles about risks that are insignificant. 
Foreman is not off base in asserting that there is hostility 
to risk assessment in the environmental justice movement. 
For many people in communities who face exposure to chemi-
cals, risk assessment often is perceived as a manipulation of 
science with inadequate information that is used to achieve 
the regulatory purpose of approving a project in spite of its 
apparent risk to public health. Linda King of the Environ-
mental Health Network states the problem well in a passage 
quoted by Foreman: 
If your community is poor, lower middle class, in the 
south, rural, or minority, you can pretty much expect to 
have your "cancer cluster" explained away by lifestyle, 
poor eating habits, alcohol consumption, or smoking. You 
can also expect the health departments to explain away 
you research result, telling you that the population sur-
veyed was too small or too large, or that the right kinds of 
questions were not asked. . .. When it is no longer in your 
control you can be assured you are not going to be happy 
with the results and not aware of how those results were 
arrived at.30 
It is wrong to dismiss risk assessment as merely pseudo-
science. The results of risk assessment for many chemicals 
are qualitatively rarely in dispute, even if the actual risk 
number is subject to controversy.31 There are certain chemi-
30. FOREMAN, supra note 1, at 114 (quoting Linda King, Health Studies: 
Can They Help or Hurt Organizing Efforts?, INDIGENOUS ENVTL. NETWORK 
NEWS, Late Summer 1996, at 10). 
31. For example, benzene, a carcinogen present in gasoline, was found by 
the California Comparative Risk Project to pose to an average individual a can-
cer risk of 2.4 x 10-4, causing an estimated 100 cancer cases per year. Methylene 
chloride, a solvent often used by dry cleaners, was found to pose an average in-
dividual cancer risk of 5.6 x 10-6, resulting in an estimated two cancer deaths a 
year. See CALIFORNIA COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECT, TOWARD THE 21ST 
CENTURY: PLANNING FOR THE PROTECTION OF CALIFORNIA'S ENVIRONMENT 
461-62 (May 1994). While benzene's risk numbers have been subjected to con-
troversy, see Industrial Union Dept. v. API, 448 U.S. 607 (1980), and methylene 
chloride's risk numbers have evolved over the years, compare Proposed Rules, 
Environmental Protection Agency, Methylene Chloride: Initiation of Regulatory 
Investigation, 50 Fed. Reg. 42037 (1985) (proposed Oct. 17, 1985), with CAL. 
CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 93000, there is little debate about which is the nastier 
chemical, and it is no surprise that the EPA has insisted upon regulating ben-
zene under its National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants pro-
gram pursuant to section 112 of the Federal Clean Air Act in 1977. 
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cals that are particularly dangerous, while others have mini-
mal risks, especially depending upon the route or pathway 
and intensity of exposure. This information is not useful to 
either environmental justice activists or the communities 
they represent. There is also a utilitarian argument that 
since risk assessment is now well integrated into regulatory 
decisions, environmental justice activists would do better to 
master and reform it than ignore it. This argument has been 
made before32 and Foreman is certainly right in making it 
again. 
However, Foreman ignores those in the movement who 
have critiqued risk assessment from a strict scientific stand-
point and suggested realistic regulatory reforms to more 
wisely incorporate its results into the regulatory process.33 
One common criticism of risk assessment studies is that the 
methodology often relies upon studies or assumptions that 
are based upon an adult white male population. Such studies 
are irrelevant to the exposed population, which typically con-
sists of minority children and women. Further, risk assess-
ment studies have difficulty integrating multiple sources of 
chemicals, or the impacts of poor medical care or diet into 
their frameworks. 
Foreman acknowledges the complaint by environmental 
justice activists that risk assessment fails to analyze cumula-
tive or synergistic impacts,34 but seems to minimize the prob-
lem. For minority populations, however, those combination 
impacts are the key issue in communities with a concentra-
tion of toxic sources, such as San Francisco's Bayview-
Hunters Point and Chester, Pennsylvania.35 
Robert R. Kuehn, former director of the Environmental 
32. See Alon Tal, A Failure to Engage, ENVTL. F., January/February 1997, 
at 13-21. 
33. The many pitfalls of risk assessment are excellently summarized in an 
article by Robert R. Kuehn, the former director of Tulane's Environmental Jus-
tice Clinic. See Kuehn, supra note 29. 
34. See FOREMAN, supra note 1, at 21. 
35. For a description of the Hunters Point hot spot data, see Alan Ramo, 
Hunters Point: Energy Development Meets Environmental Justice, ENVTL. L. 
NEWS, Spring 1996, at 155; for Chester, see Sheila Foster, Justice from the 
Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transforma-
tive Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REv. 775 (1998). 
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Justice Clinic at Tulane University, does not advocate elimi-
nating risk assessment.36 Instead, Kuehn proposes burden 
shifting; more honesty about the assumptions and limits of 
risk assessment; better participation by community organiza-
tions in forming the goals and analysis of risk assessment; 
and a means for incorporating community data into risk as-
sessment when no other data is available to evaluate impacts 
on minorities and children. 
Further, even Professor Bullard, perhaps the leading 
writer about environmental justice, does not rule out the use 
of risk assessment. He would, however, put the burden of 
proof on those who wish to expose rather than those exposed. 
Bullard proposes targeted action and resources on health 
threats. This targeting would be based in part on the use of 
risk assessment.37 It is a shame Foreman's analysis reduces 
the issue to an either/or scenario: accept risk assessment as is 
or ignore it entirely, as purportedly advocated by environ-
mental justice activists. 
B. Comparative Risks and Priority Setting 
Foreman's concern about risk assessment is at its most 
forceful when he challenges the failure of the movement to set 
priorities. Foreman's argument is really an acknowledged 
application of the comparative risk argument, most notably 
advocated by now-United States Supreme Court Justice Ste-
phen Breyer.3s As discussed by Foreman, Breyer's complaint 
is that regulatory agencies are not empowered or mandated to 
develop their priorities according to the comparative risks of 
potential environmental harms.39 Instead, Breyer advocates 
an expert agency immune to public hysteria and politics-
that, as Foreman puts it, would make as their central 
resource "the most rigorous possible analyses of risks, costs, 
benefits, and alternatives. »40 Foreman notes that Breyer is 
36. Kuehn, supra note 29, at 150-71. 
37. See Bullard, supra note 2, at 16. "The environmental justice framework 
redresses disproportionate impact through 'targeted' action and resources. This 
strategy would target resources where environmental and health problems are 
greatest (as determined by some ranking scheme but not limited to risk assess-
ment)." ld. at 18. 
38. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CmCLE: TOWARD 
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993). 
39. See BREYER, supra note 38, at 42-50, discussed in FOREMAN, supra 
note 1, at 110-11. 
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and alternatives."40 Foreman notes that Breyer is concerned 
that in appeasing popular hysteria to eliminate every harm, 
society will spend far too much in reducing what Breyer calls 
the "last little bit" and less on more significant risks that de-
serve attention.41 
Those advocating comparative risk, such as Breyer, be-
moan the irrational nature of the general public'S assessment 
of risk. They note that a lay person's untrained mind will dis-
tort risk assessment through a variety of "heuristics" (i.e., 
rules of thumb). For example, critics worry that lay people 
will confuse information that is irrelevant but seems to stand 
for risk (such as proximity being more important than expo-
sure) or become anchored to a belief (such as that hazardous 
waste sites are always dangerous in spite of repeated infor-
mation that the risks may be quite low). 
Foreman applies this idea to the environmental justice 
movement. He questions why a movement concerned with 
pollution threats to the public health of minority populations 
fails to make tobacco smoke, alcohol, and indoor pollution its 
top priorities. He certainly makes a plausible case from a 
comparative risk standpoint that more people die or have 
health impacts from these behavioral pollution problems than 
from toxic waste sites, endocrine disrupters, or industrial air 
pollution. 
The arguments about the value of comparative risk ap-
pear extensively in legal and environmental literature and 
have even carried over into both federal and state govern-
mental efforts at comparative risk.42 Those criticizing com-
parative risk to some extent apply the critiques of risk as-
sessment itself-its failure to properly evaluate different 
populations' susceptibility, its dependence upon questionable 
assumptions, and its failure to properly integrate the problem 
of multiple sources. 
40. FOREMAN, supra note 1, at 111. 
41. See id. at 110. 
42. See Report of the Environmental Justice Committee, Environmental Jus-
tice and Comparative Risk, in CALIFORNIA COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECT, supra 
note 31, at 461-62; Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A 
Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562 
(1992). 
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However, certain criticisms of comparative risk have 
even more force in the area of environmental justice, where 
lack of data about toxic impacts on minority populations is a 
particular problem. The use of certain "irrational" heuristic 
devices may in fact be quite prudent in many situations. For 
instance, such devices may be appropriate where there are 
concentrations of sources of low levels of toxic chemicals that 
individually can cause significant illness, unacceptable rates 
of cancer, or other severe illnesses with no answer to their 
cause; uncertainties about cumulative or synergistic health 
impacts from chemicals; and initial underestimations re-
garding the risks of unfamiliar sources, such as radiation or 
toxic chemicals. Donald T. Hornstein, in his Columbia Law 
Review article criticizing comparative risk, asserts that these 
same heuristic devices may in fact lead to better decisions 
than those made by experts.43 For example, the apparent 
"hysterical" reaction to the Three-Mile-Island accident led to 
an intense reevaluation of risk analysis that may have sub-
stantially improved accident prevention strategies for the nu-
clear industry and other hazardous materials operations. 
That reaction was in fact a rational response to a risk as-
sessment process that was somewhat speculative. 
Similar analysis may be made about other "irrational" 
heuristic devices. In a situation where risks are poorly un-
derstood, the "certain" data about proximity may be the best 
form of protection. Being anchored in a belief that an envi-
ronmental risk is harmful may be fully appropriate when the 
data is uncertain and significant adverse health effects are 
occurring in a community. Such a conservative assumption 
when dealing with unknown environmental risks may be the 
most prudent approach to comparative risk. 
The knowledge of toxic risks is insufficient to simply rely 
upon available data, as Foreman seems to suggest. For ex-
ample, while thirty percent of breast cancers are associated 
with known risk factors such as genetics, risk factors ac-
counting for the other seventy percent of breast cancers are 
unknown.44 Is it not a logical and appropriate regulatory pol-
icy to reduce or eliminate exposure to carcinogens whenever 
feasible when the cause of most of the cancers of a fairly 
43. See Hornstein, supra note 42, at 613. 
44. See Ramo supra note 35, at 156. 
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common cancer in women is unknown? While Foreman ac-
knowledges the logic of the argument that it is better to be 
preventive and reduce unnecessary exposure to toxics that 
may cause cancer/5 he does not seem to take that argument 
to heart in his book. 
Indeed, one of the strengths of the environmental justice 
movement has been its emphasis upon pollution prevention. 
Comparative risk, by emphasizing risk ranking and cost-
benefit analysis, too easily falls into the trap of seeking solu-
tions that incrementally reduce the greatest risks at the low-
est cost. Environmental justice advocates, in response to 
communities threatened from a seemingly overwhelming 
number of toxic sources, have searched for a more dramatic 
solution, leading to an affirmation of pollution prevention 
strategies that eliminate pollution at low cost or even a 
profit.46 This kind of approach holds great promise, yet is not 
credited by Foreman. 
Despite the shortcomings of his arguments, Foreman's 
challenge to implement priority setting should not be easily 
dismissed by the environmental justice movement. The ques-
tion remains: how should that priority setting be done, if not 
exclusively on "objective science"~7 The environmental jus-
tice movement implicitly sets priorities that have not in-
cluded alcohol, tobacco, or other behavioral public health is-
sues. 
There may be good reason for the priorities that have 
arisen from the grassroots movement. For example, there are 
already significant resources focused on alcohol and tobacco. 
Thus, the movement may legitimately choose to focus upon 
those issues left behind by the traditional environmental 
movement and the regulators. The movement's resources are 
scarce, and activist energy is limited. However, Foreman is 
right to at least pose the question to what extent the move-
ment's priorities are based upon scientific and medical merit. 
45. See FOREMAN, supra note 1, at 21. 
46. CALIFORNIA COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECT, supra note 31, at 241. 
47. Bullard, supra note 2, at 5. 
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C. Challenging the Relationship Between Environmental 
Hazards and Social and Economic Justice 
Foreman's arguments about risk assessment dovetail 
with his section on social and economic justice. Looking be-
yond his contention that activists may care less about public 
health than political power, Foreman is really challenging 
whether environmental activism is taking on social and eco-
nomic injustice in the most effective manner. That is, as-
suming it is important to attack the roots of social and eco-
nomic justice, do environmental justice activists do so in the 
most effective manner? 
Foreman discusses various environmental programs in-
tended to address social and economic problems-such as 
brownfields and environmental training-suggesting that 
those programs provide environmental justice activists an 
opportunity to make an important difference. He suggests 
that these programs are more critical for economic and social 
justice than the grassroots organizing conducted by environ-
mental justice activists. However, if environmental justice 
activists are correct that the roots of environmental disparity 
are in social and economic injustice, then perhaps it is not in-
correct for them to focus, as Foreman claims they do, on 
achieving political power. 
D. How Effective Is the Grassroots Movement? 
The final question becomes whether the movement is or-
ganized to achieve the necessary political power. Foreman 
acknowledges that the grassroots movement has made envi-
ronmental justice a matter of national "environmental policy 
discourse.'M8 However, he questions whether a grassroots 
movement can really make the kind of fundamental change 
advocated by environmental justice activists. Foreman con-
tends that such change requires impacting national policy. 
He notes that the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") 
institutional response to the environmental justice question is 
the formation of the National Environmental Justice Advi-
sory Council, an organization that has an "absence of author-
ity and highly restricted institutional capacity.'M9 He ques-
tions whether the Clinton administration's environmental 
48. See FOREMAN, supra note 1, at 122. 
49. Id. at 49. 
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justice policy involves more than a "general yearning to listen 
hard and do good.,,50 Indeed, the John Lewis-sponsored Envi-
ronmental Justice Act51 (cosponsored by then-Senator AI 
Gore) is still locked in congressional committees. 
Foreman notes that in the four years after President 
Clinton's executive order on environmental justice called for 
federal agencies to ensure that all programs or activities re-
ceiving federal financial assistance do not discriminate in 
violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,52 no administra-
tive complaint under Title VI had been sustained or even de-
cided on the merits (although there are dozens pending).53 
Indeed, since the executive order, the EPA has only ruled on 
one complaint on the merits, denying the complaint because, 
according to the EPA, there was insufficient evidence that 
federal health standards were being violated, and other po-
tential disparate impacts were not proven.54 Congress has 
even been more hostile, prohibiting the EPA's implementa-
tion of its "Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI Ad-
ministrative Complaints Challenging Permits," released by 
the EPA in February 1998.55 
Nevertheless, Foreman to some extent underestimates 
the movement's influence. Federal agencies have adopted en-
vironmental justice policies and those policies have some in-
fluence on the myriad decisions made by these agencies on a 
day-to-day basis.56 Further, states like California have incor-
50. Id. at 63. 
51. H.R. Res. 1510, 106th Congo (1999). 
52. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994). 
53. See FOREMAN, supra note 1, at 123. 
54. See Letter from Ann E. Goode, Director, EPA's Office of Civil Rights to 
St. Francis Prayer Center and Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 
(Oct 30, 1998) (available at <http://www.epa.gov/reg50opa/steelcvr.htm>). The 
letter concerns the dismissal of EPA File No. 5R-98-R5, the "Select Steel Com-
plaint," a Title VI complaint against the Michigan Department of Environ-
mental Quality. See id. 
55. See Veterans Affairs and HUD Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 
tit. nr, 112 Stat. 2461, 2496 (1998). 
56. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF FEDERAL 
ACTMTIES, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
CONCERNS IN EPA's NEPA COMPLIANCE ANALYSES (Apr. 1998); COUNCIL ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE: GUIDANCE UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL Poucy ACT (Dec. 
10, 1997); In re Louisiana Energy Services, 47 N.R.C. 77 (1998) (remanding nu-
clear power plant licensing decision because of disparate impacts). 
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porated environmental justice principles into state law.57 
Major companies and their trade associations have also 
adopted or are considering environmental justice policies.58 
V. CONCLUSION 
Foreman is not mistaken that the movement has a way 
to go before it can be considered as influential as the major 
traditional environmental organizations. Foreman's argu-
ments, in a positive sense, serve as a plea for the movement 
to solidify its achievements by building a more formative na-
tional agenda and political presence. To do so requires the 
movement to ground itself in science, where it is useful and 
available; to hone its agenda to better communicate and focus 
its program; and to mobilize politically through institutions 
capable of influencing national policy. These recommenda-
tions are valuable suggestions to the movement. 
57. See 1999 Cal. Legis. Servo 690 (West). 
58. See California Council for Environmental and Economic Balance, 
CCEEB General Info (visited Apr. 2, 2000) <http://www.cceeb.org/ indi-
ces/general_info.html>. 
